Once again, two children are drowning: one is your child, one is a stranger. Whom ought you to save? Partialists require you to save your child, because it is your child. The requirement is universal: any parent must save his or her child because it is his or her child. An impartialist theory such as rule utilitarianism might also require you to give precedence to your child, but the rule would be justified on grounds of utility, not because the rule would be justified on grounds of utility, not because the child is yours. I argue that it would be irrational for morality to demand that we give precedence to the dictates of partiality. For if partialist theories demand that our concern to help those in our "inner sphere" ought to override impartial consideration for everyone, they demand that we act in ways that disfavor those who got to be in their position as a matter of luck. I defend the impartialist's view that, in conflict cases (where partialist and impartialist theories diverge) involving two persons, our moral obligations should not dictate disfavoring one person on the basis of that person's having some property that is dependent on luck, where the ProPerty is the only difference between the two persons. Drawing on Thomas Nagel's cases of moral luck, I attempt to establish the irrationality charge by comparing being related to other properties impartialist theories take to be irrelevant to determining obligations, namely, proximity to an agent, the generation of which a person is a member, and the time a desire is possessed. The case of partiality, or favoring those in our "inner sphere," is relevantly analogous to these cases, so the irrationality charge applies to it, as well. I conclude that if partialists do not adequately defend favoring relations, partialist theories are doomed to irrationality.