discussion of my paper calls for a response at three different points.
(1) The sole concern of my paper was to refute three interesting versions of the non-deducibility thesis and replace each with a version which seems true but trivial. To this end, I argued that certain is-statements do entail certain ought-statements. Now Edgar complains that I provided no general criteria for distinguishing ought-statements from is-statements. But exactly how serious is this complaint? After all, it seems foolhardy to suppose that one cannot recognize a particular x that is F unless one first has a criterion for deciding what it is for any x to be F. No, if Edgar has a telling objection, it must be that either the entailments do not hold or else the examples of is-statements and ought-statements used in my argument are not genuine.
(2) Edgar objects that I offer no reasons for thinking that some contradictions are is-statements and some necessary truths are ought-statements. Fine. A few good reasons for so thinking are as follows. In general, if P is an is-statement and Q is another is-statement, then there must be a set of is-statements containing P and Q as members. Secondly, if P is an isstatement, so too is not-P an is-statement. From this, it follows that where P is an is-statement, there is the inconsistent set of is-statements containing P and its complement as members. Hence some inconsistent sets are nevertheless sets of is-statements. Similar remarks apply to some oughtstatements. In general, if P and Q are individual ought-statements, then P or Q must be an ought-statement. Next, if P is an ought-statement, then the complement of P is also an ought-statement. Thus, if P is an oughtstatement, it follows that the disjunction of P with its complement is a necessarily true ought-statement.
(3) Finally, Edgar finds my second counterexample to version (T2) of the thesis wanting. (Incidentally, he discusses my first counterexample not at all.) He claims here that "if the premise is false then either the conclusion or its negation follows. However, one cannot discover his obligations from statements of the form 'Q or not-Q,' and thus the conclusion is not an ought-statement." This is a howler. The conclusion of the argument in question is not of the form Q or not-Q; rather, it says that for any action A, Socrates is obligated to do .4 if and only if Plato's most distinguished teacher is obligated to do ,4. And this, I should think, is clearly an oughtstatement. Edgar seems to have confused the conclusion of the argument with something entirely different: the disjunction of the conclusion with its complement.