This paper studies the exercise of market power in price-regulated electricity industries under peak-load pricing and merit order dispatching, but where investment decisions are taken by independent generating companies. Within this context, we show that producers can exercise market power by under-
Modelling the effects of interconnection between electricity markets subject to uncertainty
β Scribed by E. J. Anderson; A. B. Philpott; H. Xu
- Book ID
- 105857319
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 325 KB
- Volume
- 65
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0340-9422
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This paper presents an analysis of different market designs under uncertainty about the future growth rate of demand. Markets for electricity generation appear to be prone to an investment cycle due to their capital-intensiveness and the long lead time of new generation facilities. We tested the sta
However, several previous studies have focused on market imperfections (transactions costs, taxes) or market inefficiency 10 explain the differences between futures and forward prices. See Capozza and Cornell (1979), B n g and Rasche (1978), Burger, Lang, and Rasche (1977), and Kane (1980) for marke