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Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game

✍ Scribed by Boyd, Robert (author)

Book ID: 108360485
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1989
Tongue: English
Weight: 638 KB
Volume: 136
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-5193(89)80188-2

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