Minority game with peer pressure
β Scribed by H.F Chau; F.K Chow; K.H Ho
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2004
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 328 KB
- Volume
- 332
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0378-4371
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selΓΏsh player uses both the historical minority choice of the population and the historical choice of one's neighbors in an unbiased manner to make decision. Results of numerical simulation show that the level of cooperation in the networked minority game di ers remarkably from the original minority game as well as the prediction of the crowd-anticrowd theory. We argue that the deviation from the crowd-anticrowd theory is due to the negligence of the e ect of a four point correlation function in the e ective Hamiltonian of the system.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
This paper proposes a new model of Incomplete Minority Game (IMG), which features a default hierarchy of rules. This model introduces random bits into players' individual strategies and is capable of applying the exception rules in the absence of the default one. Analysis of the numerical experiment