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Minority game with peer pressure

✍ Scribed by H.F Chau; F.K Chow; K.H Ho


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2004
Tongue
English
Weight
328 KB
Volume
332
Category
Article
ISSN
0378-4371

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✦ Synopsis


To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selΓΏsh player uses both the historical minority choice of the population and the historical choice of one's neighbors in an unbiased manner to make decision. Results of numerical simulation show that the level of cooperation in the networked minority game di ers remarkably from the original minority game as well as the prediction of the crowd-anticrowd theory. We argue that the deviation from the crowd-anticrowd theory is due to the negligence of the e ect of a four point correlation function in the e ective Hamiltonian of the system.


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