This volume develops a theory of meaning and a semantics for both mathematical and empirical sentences inspired to Chomskyβs internalism, namely to a view of semantics as the study of the relations of language not with external reality but with internal, or mental, reality. In the first part a theoretical notion of justification for a sentence A is defined, by induction on the complexity of A; intuitively, justifications are conceived as cognitive states of a particular kind. The main source of inspiration for this part is Heytingβs explanation of the intuitionistic meaning of logical constants.
In the second part the theory is applied to the solution of several foundational problems in the theory of meaning and epistemology, such as Fregeβs puzzle, Matesβ puzzle about synonymy, the paradox of analysis, Kripkeβs puzzle about belief, the de re/de dicto distinction, the specific/non-specific distinction, Gettierβs problems, the paradox of knowability, and the characterization of truth. On a more general philosophical level, throughout the book the author develops a tight critique of the neo-verificationism of Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-LΓΆf, and defends a mentalist interpretation of intuitionism.