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Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective

✍ Scribed by Holmstrom, Bengt

Book ID
108533864
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
1999
Tongue
English
Weight
492 KB
Volume
66
Category
Article
ISSN
0034-6527

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