In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contrac
Managerial Bonus Systems in a Differentiated Duopoly: A Comment
β Scribed by Thijs Jansen; Arie van Lier; Arjen van Witteloostuijn
- Book ID
- 102502794
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2011
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 230 KB
- Volume
- 33
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.1562
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β¦ Synopsis
A differentiated Cournot duopoly is considered where firm owners delegate the output decision to a manager, who is rewarded on the basis of his performance. If this performance is measured in terms of (i) pure profits, (ii) a combination of profits and sales, (iii) a combination of profits and market share or (iv) relative profits, the latter option strictly dominates the others if the products are perfect substitutes. Recently it was claimed that this result does not hold for all levels of product substitutability. In this comment, we show however that this result is robust against the introduction of product differentiation. Copyright Β© 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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