Majority-consistent preference orderings

✍ Scribed by John Craven

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1996
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 432 KB
• Volume: 13
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00179230

✦ Synopsis

This paper considers the construction of sets of preferences that give consistent outcomes under majority voting. Fishburn [7] shows that by combining the concepts of single-peaked and single-troughed preferences (which are themselves examples of value restriction) it is possible to provide a simple description of the extent of agreement between individuals that allows the construction of sets that are as large as those previously known (for fewer than 7 alternatives) and larger than those previously known (for 7 or more alternatives). This paper gives a characterisation of the preferences generated through these agreements and makes observations on the relation between the sizes of such sets as the number of alternatives increases.