Some philosophers attempt to ground ethics in rationality in such a manner that the person who fails to adopt any moral system (an amoralist) has made some sort of rational, nonmoral mistake. Professors Alan Gewirth and R.M. Hare hold such a view, but for different reasons. ~ Gewirth believes that morality is based upon logic so that a perfectly logical person would either have to adopt a moral system or be logically inconsistent (p. X). Thus, on Gewirth's view, logical considerations should suffice to persuade any rational person to adopt a moral system. On this view it should be possible to show that an amoralist is logically inconsistent. R.M. Hare's view is somewhat different. Because of the weight that Hare gives to logical consistency he recognizes that the possibility of a rationally consistent amoralist presents an embarrassment for his theory (p. 186). However, the embarrassment arises from the possibility that Hare might have nothing to say to the amoralist. BUt Hare believes that he does have something to say. He believes he can give prudential reasons which would or ouo~ht to persuade the amoralist to adopt a moral system. Hare essentially argues that it would be prudent for the rational individual to be moral because the individual lives in a society in which to be moral is prudent (pp. 193-198).
In what follows I shall argue that the reasons given against amoralism by Gewirth and Hare are unsatisfactory. In a postscript, I will suggest what really is wrong with amoralism, and I will point out the implications of this for ethical theory.
In criticizing Gewirth and Hare I shall focus upon their treatment of the amoralist, but one point needs to be made immediately. Gewirth and Hare cast the problem in terms of amoralism rather than non-moralism. To do so distorts and prejudices the issue. To think of an amoralist as an a-moralist is already to give morality more than its logical, linguistic, or prudential due.