ways to counter the problems associated with self-regulation. Very little is said about information asymmetry issues and the perverse selection problems associated with self-regulation: How will selfregulation be established in a sector if a substantial proportion of the NGOs are inefficient and corrupt? If regulation is voluntary, why would inefficient and corrupt organisations choose to subject themselves to such a process?
The book is likely to increase awareness of accountability issues among practitioners and allow them to learn from previous experiments in this field. This is also where its main value lies.
However, many researchers will also find it useful. The wide variety of detailed case studies gives this book remarkable range and depth. It continually reminds the reader of the importance of context and stresses the complexity of creating an enabling environment for this hetereogenous group of organisations. In addition to the weaknesses highlighted above, some researchers may find the scant referencing of empirical claims frustrating (it varies, but most chapters have approximately one reference per page) and may be disappointed by the conceptual/theoretical chapters' (Chapters 2 and 3) narrow focus on international NGOs and advocacy NGOs.