Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A reply
โ Scribed by Gene E. Mumy
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1981
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 32 KB
- Volume
- 37
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
In their comment on, 'Long-Run Efficiency and Property Rights Sharing for Pollution Control,' Beavis and Walker (BW) claim that the deduced inefficiency of an effluent standards program is the result of my assumption that effluent rights cannot be traded. No trading, however, is not an assumption but a real attribute of actual standards programs and BW and I agree that this attribute makes standards inefficient. We also agree that if the standard is treated as an equitable property right assignment, then allowing trading in effluent rights can make a politically acceptable program efficient. The real point they are making is that the price of effluent rights should be market determined whereas in my model the government establishes the tax/subsidy price under EPRS. To the extent that a market is a more efficient and flexible processor of the relevant information, their point is well taken, but it is only obscured by raising the issue of whether I have assumed or merely described the attributes of a standards program.
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