✦ LIBER ✦

Limited-move equilibria In 2 × 2 games

✍ Scribed by Frank C. Zagare

Publisher: Springer US
Year: 1984
Tongue: English
Weight: 778 KB
Volume: 16
Category: Article
ISSN: 0040-5833
DOI: 10.1007/bf00141672

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Entrapment in 2×2 games with force vulne

Entrapment in 2×2 games with force vulnerable equilibria

✍ Marguerite B. Stevenson; James L. Phillips 📂 Article 📅 1972 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 835 KB

Far-sighted equilibria in 2 × 2, non-coo

Far-sighted equilibria in 2 × 2, non-cooperative, repeated games

✍ Jan Aaftink 📂 Article 📅 1989 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 677 KB

Consider a two-person simultaneous-move game in strategic form. Suppose this game is played over and over at discrete points in time. Suppose, furthermore, that communication is not possible, but nevertheless we observe some regularity in the sequence of outcomes. The aim of this paper is to provide

On the asymptotic convergence to mixed e

On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games

✍ María Sáez-Martí 📂 Article 📅 1997 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 461 KB

Binary 2 × 2 games

✍ Peter C. Fishburn; D. Marc Kilgour 📂 Article 📅 1990 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 787 KB

The 2 • 2 game is the simplest interactive decision model that portrays concerned decision makers with genuine choices. There are two players, each of whom must choose one of two strategies, so that there are four possible outcomes. Binary 2 x 2 games are 2 • 2 games with no restrictions on the play

Decision pressures in 2 × 2 games

✍ Karl W. Lendenmann; Anatol Rapoport 📂 Article 📅 1980 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 965 KB

Absorbing outcomes in 2 × 2 games

✍ Steven J. Brams; Marek P. Hessel 📂 Article 📅 1982 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 706 KB