Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates

✍ Scribed by David Palmer

• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
• Year: 2014
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 246
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This title provides a collection of essays on the libertarian position on free will and related issues that focus specifically on the views of philosopher Robert Kane. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers, the essays range from various areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Libertarian Free Will:
Contemporary Debates
COPYRIGHT
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CONTRIBUTORS
CHAPTER 1:
Free Will, Libertarianism, and Kane
1. LIBERTARIAN TH EORIES OF FREE WILL
2. THE LUCK OBJECTION
3. INCOMPATIBILISM AND OMISSIONS
4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE
WILL
5. KANE’S REPLY
PART I:
Libertarian Theories of Free Will
CHAPTER 2:
Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?
CHAPTER 3:
Free Will and Metaphysics
1. KANEAN LIBERTARIANISM
2. TWO METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS OF KANE’S ACCOUNT
2.1 Ontological Irreducibility of Mental States
2.2 Causal Nonreductionism
3. NEO-ARISTOTELIAN FREEDOM
PART II:
The Luck Objection
CHAPTER 4:
Kane, Luck, and Control: Trying to Get by without Too Much Effort
1. KANE ON LUCK
2. EVENT-CAUSAL LIBERTARIANISM AND CONTROL
3. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 5:
Toward a Solution to the Luck Problem
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE LUCK PROBLEM, KANE’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO KINDS OF CONTROL , AND THREE EXAMPLES
3. RESIDUAL WORRIES
4. THE RANDOM MACHINE EXAMPLE
5. COUNTERFACTUAL INTERVENERS: UNTRIGGERED ENSURERS AND UNTRIGGERED PREEMPTORS
6. CONCLUSION
PART III:
Incompatibilism and Omissions
CHAPTER 6:
Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U Condition
1. KANE’S ACCOUNT OF ULTIMACY
2. ULTIMACY IS SITUATED WITHIN KANE’S THEORY OF FREE WILL
3. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SFAS
4. COMPATIBILISTS’ SHORTCOMINGS?
5. A MISPLACED CRITICISM OF KANE’S COMMITMENT TO ULTIMACY
6. THE ULTIMACY ARGUMENT AND KANE’S GROUNDS FOR U
7. COMPATIBILISTS’ OPTIONS FOR RESISTING THE ULTIMACY ARGUMENT
8. CLAIMING ULTIMACY FOR COMPATIBILISTS
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
CHAPTER 7:
The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism
1. INTRODUCTION
2. DIALECTICAL OBJECTIONS
2.1 M cKenna’s Dialectical Objection
2.1.1 Response #1: Meeting McKenna’s challenge
2.1.2 Response #2: The Dialectical Situation
2.2 Widerker’s Dialectical Criticisms of DA
2.2.1 Assessment of (W1)
2.2.2 Assessment of (W2)
3. ALLEGED COUNTEREXAMPLES TO TRANSFER NR
3.1. R avizza and Fischer’s Counterexample
3.1.1 McKenna’s Response
3.1.2 Widerker’s Response
3.2 Haji’s Example
3.2.1 Our Response
3.3 S habo’s Counterexample
3.4 A New Example: Molecules
4. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 8:
Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act
1. OMITTING FREELY
2. ABILITY NOT TO ACT
3. BASIC RESPONSIBILITY
4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OMISSIONS
5. MORAL ASSESSABILITY
6. A PROPOSAL
PART IV:
The Significance of Free Will
CHAPTER 9:
Responsibility for Emotions, Alternative Possibilities, and Reasons
1. THE RATIONAL RELATIONS VIEW
2. ATTITUDES AND REASONS
3. A REQUIREMENT OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR OBJECTIVE PRO TANTO REASONS
4. ATTITUDES AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
5. DETERMINISM AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES
CHAPTER 10:
Moral Responsibility, the Reactive Attitudes, and the Significance of (Libertarian) Free Will
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ANSWERING THE SIGNIFICANCE QUESTION FROM THE VALUE OF ORIGINATION
3. A CONTRASTING APPROACH AND A CASE STUDY
4. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 11:
The Dialectic of Selfhood and the Significance of Free Will
1. LOVE, PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES
2. THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL
3. FINAL WORDS
PART V: Kane’s Reply
CHAPTER 12:
New Arguments in Debates on Libertarian Free Will: Responses to Contributors
1. THE COMPATIBILITY QUESTION: MCKENNA, HAJI, WIDERKER AND SCHNALL , AND CLARKE
1.1 M cKenna and UR
1.2 Haji and Alternative Possibilities
1.3 Widerker, Schnall, and the Direct Argument for Incompatibilism
1.4 Clarke on Omissions
2. THE INTELLIGIBILITY QUESTION: MELE, GINET, FISCHER, PEREBOOM, AND O’CONNOR
2.1 Objections (1): Luck and Chance: Fischer, Mele, and Others
2.2 Objections (2): Efforts, Phenomenology, and Rationality: Mele and Ginet
2.3 Objections (3): Regress Objections and Kinds of Control: Mele, Ginet, Fischer, Clarke, and Pereboom
2.4 A lternative Libertarian Views—Noncausalism: Ginet
2.5 A lternative Libertarian Views—Agent-Causal Views: O’Connor
2.6 A lternative Libertarian Views—Daring Libertarianism: Mele
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE QUESTION: PEREBOOM, NELKIN, AND HAJI
REFERENCES
INDEX