[Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems] Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances Volume 668 || Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory
✍ Scribed by Çetiner, Demet
- Book ID
- 121416487
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Year
- 2013
- Tongue
- German
- Weight
- 409 KB
- Edition
- 2013
- Category
- Article
- ISBN
- 3642358225
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.