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Learning Rules for Social Foragers: Implications for the Producer–Scrounger Game and Ideal Free Distribution Theory

✍ Scribed by GUY BEAUCHAMP


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
207 KB
Volume
207
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

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✦ Synopsis


In population games, the optimal behaviour of a forager depends partly on courses of action selected by other individuals in the population. How individuals learn to allocate e!ort in foraging games involving frequency-dependent payo!s has been little examined. The performance of three di!erent learning rules was investigated in several types of habitats in each of two population games. Learning rules allow individuals to weigh information about the past and the present and to choose among alternative patterns of behaviour. In the pro-ducer}scrounger game, foragers use producer to locate food patches and scrounger to exploit the food discoveries of others. In the ideal free distribution game, foragers that experience feeding interference from companions distribute themselves among heterogeneous food patches. In simulations of each population game, the use of di!erent learning rules induced large variation in foraging behaviour, thus providing a tool to assess the relevance of each learning rule in experimental systems. Rare mutants using alternative learning rules often successfully invaded populations of foragers using other rules indicating that some learning rules are not stable when pitted against each other. Learning rules often closely approximated optimal behaviour in each population game suggesting that stimulus}response learning of contingencies created by foraging companions could be su$cient to perform at near-optimal level in two population games.