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Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game

โœ Scribed by Miguel A. Costa-Gomes; Klaus G. Zauner

Publisher
Springer
Year
2003
Tongue
English
Weight
425 KB
Volume
22
Category
Article
ISSN
0938-2259

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