𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

✍ Scribed by Kandori, Michihiro; Mailath, George J.; Rob, Rafael


Book ID
125436043
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
1993
Tongue
English
Weight
554 KB
Volume
61
Category
Article
ISSN
0012-9682

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


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Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental