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Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence

✍ Scribed by John Duffy; Ed Hopkins

Book ID: 116505629
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 691 KB
Volume: 51
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.007

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