✦ LIBER ✦

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

✍ Scribed by Drew Fudenberg; Yuichi Yamamoto

Book ID: 113708280
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2011
Tongue: English
Weight: 323 KB
Volume: 146
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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This paper examines the abilities of standard game-theoretic solution concepts (static Nash equilibrium) and a simple model of individual learning to describe subject behavior in an experiment involving private-information games with mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. The experimental data ar