This book is a collection of 15 essays on important themes in Wittgensteinβs philosophy, divided into three sections. The first section is about philosophy of language, in particular Wittgensteinβs key idea of linguistic normativity. The second section is mainly concerned with important Wittgenstein
Language, Mind and Value: Philosophical Essays
β Scribed by J. N. Findlay
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Year
- 2016
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 260
- Series
- Routledge Library Editions: Philosophy of Language
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Philosophical themes as diverse as language, value, mind and God are among the topics discussed in this book, originally published in 1963. Considerably influential, there are contributions on Time, Camrbidge Philosophy, Doedelian Sentences, Morality by Convention and the Non-Existence of God. They reflect a gradual move from a position where the influence of Wittgenstein is paramount, to a position where there is considerable criticism of linguistic philosophy and a growing interest in the approaches of Hegel and the phenomenologists.
β¦ Table of Contents
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Original Title Page
Original Copyright Page
Preface
Table of Contents
I Some Reactions to Recent Cambridge Philosophy (1940-1)
II Time: A Treatment of Some Puzzles (1941)
III Goedelian Sentences: A Non-Numerical Approach (1942)
IV Morality by Convention (1944)
V Can God's Existence be Disproved? (1948)
VI Values in Speaking (1950)
VII Linguistic Approach to Psycho-Physics (1950)
VIII The Notion of Infinity (1953)
IX The Justification of Attitudes (1954)
X The Logic of 'Bewusstseinslagen' (1955)
XI Review of Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' (1955)
XII Some Reflections on Meaning (1959)
XIII The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel (1959)
XIV Some Neglected Issues in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore (1960)
XV The Methodology of Normative Ethics (1961)
Index
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