Laissez-faire in campaign finance

✍ Scribed by W. Mark Crain; Robert D. Tollison; Donald R. Leavens

• Book ID: 104633907
• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1988
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 604 KB
• Volume: 56
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00130271

✦ Synopsis

In this paper we analyze the impact of campaign contribution limits on government expenditures. The theory is based on the proclivity of geographic-based legislators to support wealth transfers from the polity at large to finance benefits for local constituents. It predicts that laissez-faire in contributions will lead to less government spending on budgetary redistribution and to a greater output of laws by the legislature. The theory is tested using data on U.S. State governments.