Knowing and believing in the original position

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1989
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 804 KB
• Volume: 27
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0040-5833
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00135098

✦ Synopsis

I describe John Rawls' concept of the original position, a concept which plays a crucial role in his theory of justice. Then I provide an internal critique of this concept, arguing that there is some incoherence concerning the following Rawlsian claims: (1) that the parties in the original position are free and equal rational persons;

(2) that the goal and outcome of the original position is a social contract; (3) that Rawls' principles of justice would be chosen in the original position; (4) that the persons behind the veil of ignorance in the original position know their own or another's social position; and (5) that persons in the actual world can at any time participate in the original position. My argument is not that such incoherence proves the end of Rawls' theory of justice, but that his concept of the manner by which principles of justice are selected and agreed on by rational agents needs rethinking.