Some years ago, while reading Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, it struck me that there was a rational argument imbedded in the central section which claims that truth is subjectivity. Apparently, at about the same time, it must also have struck Louis P. Pojman of Christ Church, Oxford, since I have recently come across a paper of his entitled "Kierkegaard on Justification of Belief" which argues to that effect. 1 Upon careful reading of his article, however, it seemed more and more to me that our views were not actually similar, or if so, only on the surface. In fact, I finally sensed that Mr. Pojman had misused the argument of the Postscript I had been so intent to delimit. In order, then, to defend that argument against a possible abuse, and reassert what I take to be the position of the Postscript itself, I hope here to examine certain matters in an attempt to offer an extensive criticism of Pojman's account which might both convincingly refute his position as well as clarify my own.
Since I have already developed a fairly specific version of the argument of the Postscript elsewhere, I will try to present that account as briefly as possible. 2 I took the argument to be aimed, according to its author's own admission, at the task of making "the necessity of the paradox evident," 3 and claimed the logic of that reasoning, which led to the positing of the absurd, to be moving according to the following design, here summarized into 14 points.