Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics

✍ Scribed by Julian Wuerth;

• Publisher: OUP Premium
• Year: 2014
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 366
• Category: Library

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Sources and Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I. Kant on Mind
Chapter 1. Kant and the Soul as Simple Substance, Pre-Critique
Chapter 2. Kant’s Immediatism, Pre-Critique
Chapter 3. Transcendental Idealism and Immediatism, Pre-Critique
Chapter 4. Kant’s Pre-Critique Rejection of Rational Psychologists’ Views on Substance: Background on the First Analogy, the Amphiboly, and the First Paralogism
Chapter 5. Kant’s Substantial Soul: The Paralogisms and Beyond
Part II. Kant on Action and Ethics
Chapter 6. Kant’s Map of the Mind
Chapter 7. Sidgwick, Good Freedom, and the Wille/Willkür Distinction Before, In, and After the Groundwork
Chapter 8. Korsgaard’s Intellectualized First-Person Account of Kant’s Practical Agent
Chapter 9. Kant’s Moral Realism and Korsgaard’s Constructivism
PART I: Kant on Mind
1: Kant and the Soul as Simple Substance, Pre-Critique
1. Rejecting Kitcher’s Reductionist, FunctionalistHistorical Thesis
2. The Positive Thesis: Kant’s Nonreductionist Conclusions on the Soul
3. Conclusion
2: Kant’s Immediatism, Pre-Critique
1. Kant’s Pseudo-Empirical Immediatism
2. Kant’s Transcendental Immediatism
3. Conclusion
3: Transcendental Idealism and Immediatism, Pre-Critique
1. Distinctions in Kind, the Discursivity Thesis, and the Pure Forms of Intuition
2. The Contribution Thesis and Immediatism
3. Conclusion
4: Kant’s Pre-Critique Rejection of Rational Psychologists’ Views on Substance: Background on the First Analogy, the Amphiboly, and the First Paralogism
1. Immediatism and the Ontological Significance of Substance, Pre-Critique
2. Clues from the Critique and Prolegomena
3. Kant’s Rejection of the Permanence of Substance
4. Immortality, Pre-Critique
5. The Assumption of Permanence, through 1770
6. Registering the Humean Threat
7. Drawing a Distinction between Noumenal Substance and Phenomenal Substance, Post-1769
8. The Assumption of the Permanence of Phenomenal Substance, in Particular, as a Condition for Experience
9. Kant and the “Real”
10. The Rationalists’ Inferences
11. Conclusion
5: Kant’s Substantial Soul: The Paralogisms and Beyond
1. The Context for the Paralogisms within the Critique of Pure Reason
Indeterminate pure apperception versus determinate empirical apperception
What pure consciousness of ourselves is a pure consciousness of: an indeterminate thing in itself
Indeterminate, pure, transcendental concepts, or pure categories, which are ontologically significant but useless; and determinate, empirical concepts, which are ontologically significant and useful
2. The Broader Context for the Paralogisms in Kant’s Recorded Thought outside the Critique, Post-1780
Kant’s views on the soul as substance, post-1780, in his personal Reflexionen
Kant’s views on the soul as substance, post-1780, in his lectures
Kant’s views on the soul as simple in the broader post-1780 context
Kant’s views on the soul as identical in the broader post-1780 context
3. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason
“Observation on the sum of the pure doctrine of the soul, following these paralogisms”
The Paralogisms
4. Conclusion
PART II: Kant on Action and Ethics
6: Kant’s Map of the Mind
1. Kant’s Account of the Mind’s Powers: An OftenObscured Framework
2. The Fundamental Faculties, Ontology, and the Regulative Idea of Unity
3. A First Look at the Three Fundamental Faculties, of Cognition, Feeling, and Desire
4. Self-Consciousness, Reflection, and the Dawning and Development of Rational Agency
5. Personality
6. The Higher and Lower Faculties, and the Origins of our Representations: Within Us and Without Us
7. The Higher Faculties, or the Spontaneous, Intellectual, Rational, or Self-Active Faculties; and the Lower Faculties, or the Receptive, Sensual, Sensuous, Sensitive, or Passive Faculties
Understanding and sensibility
Intellectual, rational, spontaneous, and self-active; and sensual, sensitive, passive, and receptive
8. Intelligence and Animality
9. Humanity
10. Spirit, Mind, and Soul (Anima)
11. A Closer Look at the Faculties of Cognition, Feeling, and Desire: Their Internal Divisions, Subfaculties, and Respective Representations
The faculty of cognition
The faculty of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure
The faculty of desire
12. Conclusion
7: Sidgwick, Good Freedom, and the Wille/Willkür Distinction Before, In, and After the Groundwork
1. Sidgwick and the Wille/Willkür Distinction
2. Wille and Willkür in the Religion and the Metaphysics of Morals
3. The Legislative Faculty/Executive Faculty Distinction, Pre-Religion
4. Conclusion
8: Korsgaard’s Intellectualized First-Person Account of Kant’s Practical Agent
1. Korsgaard’s View that the Structure of Choice Defines the Problem of Ethics and its Answer
The Importance of Understanding the Problem of Choice: Korsgaard’s View that a Clear Statement of a Philosophical Problem is also a Statement of the Solution
Korsgaard on the Role of Self-Consciousness in Structuring the Problem of Choice
Korsgaard on Pure Practical Reason as the Self that Chooses from Reflective Distance, as in Sidgwick’s Good Freedom Interpretation
2. Korsgaard’s Intellectualized Agent, From a First-Person Perspective
3. Korsgaard’s View that there is no Incentive to Choose Immorally, and the Resulting Problem of Moral Responsibility for Immoral Actions
4. Conclusion
9: Kant’s Moral Realism and Korsgaard’s Constructivism
1. Kant’s Argument for the Formula of Humanity, his Elimination of Sensibility Procedure, and Korsgaard’s Regress Interpretation
A Brief Detour to the Critique of Practical Reason
KORSGAARD’S INTELLECTUALIST MOMENT
KORSGAARD’S MORAL ANTI-REALIST MOMENT
KORSGAARD’S CONATIVE VACUUM MOMENT
KORSGAARD’S MOMENT OF MAGIC
Evidence from the rest of the Groundwork and Other Sources Regarding (a) the Formula of Humanity as Kant’s Attempt to Cognize an Unconditionally Valuable End A Priori and (b) Kant’s Understanding of the Conditions for Conditionally Valuable Ends
How Kant’s Map of the Mind’s Faculties also Makes Obvious that the Conditioned Value of Objects of Inclination Rests in the Condition of Our Sensibility and not in a Commitment to Humanity
Kant’s “Elimination of Sensibility Procedure” for Attaining Clarity in our Cognition of the Moral Law, as Employed in the Formula of Humanity and other Formulations of the Categorical Imperative
2. Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
3. Korsgaard’s Constructivism and Sidgwick’s Good Freedom as Intellectualist
4. Inspiration to Act Morally
5. Conclusion
Bibliography
Index