β Scribed by Wrynn Smith
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
Due to a misreading of Kant's reversibility criterion, J.G. Murphy has claimed that the view L. W. Beck ascribes to Kant in the 'Second Analogy' in the Critique of Pure Reason presupposes rather than demonstrates the General Law of Causality (GLC as I shall call it). 1 Indeed, Kant does seek in the 'Second Analogy' to show that GLC is a necessary presupposition of experience as we know it, i.e., as an experience which partly consists of events. But far from merely presupposing the truth of GLC, Kant demonstrates the truth of this claim by showing that empirical statements, accepted as true by 'any sane man including Hume', deductively imply GLC. 2 I. KANT'S ARGUMENT
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
The use of orthogonal expansions leads sometimes to results that clearly do not satisfy the causality law. The best known.example is the filtering of a step function by a lowpass filter with idealized frequency cut-off. The Fourier transform yields in this case an output function starting at the tim
It has been argued by Shepard that there is a robust psychological law that relates the distance between a pair of items in psychological space and the probability that they will be perceived as similar. Specifically, this probability is a negative exponential function of the distance between the pa