✦ LIBER ✦

Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis

✍ Scribed by Hideshi Itoh

Book ID: 115875304
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1994
Tongue: English
Weight: 683 KB
Volume: 38
Category: Article
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-x

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