Is the way to moral truth through theory? Or do we already know what?s right and wrong? Throughout modern history philosophers have tried to construct elaborate moral systems to determine what?s right. Recently, however, some have revived the position that we have intuitive knowledge of right and wr
Intuitionism
โ Scribed by David Kaspar
- Publisher
- Bloomsbury Academic
- Year
- 2012
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 233
- Series
- Bloomsbury Ethics
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Or do we already know what's right and wrong?
Throughout modern history philosophers have tried to construct elaborate moral systems to determine what's right. Recently, however, some have revived the position that we have intuitive knowledge of right and wrong. In this book, David Kaspar introduces and explores the perspective known as 'Intuitionism'. Charting intuitionism's fall in the twentieth century and its recent resurgence, Kaspar looks at the intuitionist approach to the most important topics in ethics, from moral knowledge to intrinsically good moral action.
David Kaspar defends intuitionism against criticisms from competing metaethical schools, such as moral nihilism and ethical naturalism. It also takes on normative rivals, such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. By consolidating the stronger claims of both early analytic and contemporary intuitionists, Kaspar goes on to make a robust case for a rigorously intuitionist approach to explaining morality. Intuitionism also includes chapter summaries and guides to further reading throughout to help readers explore and master this important school of contemporary ethical thought. This is an ideal resource for undergraduates and postgraduates taking courses in ethics, metaethics and moral philosophy.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
A defense of ethical intuitionism where (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know these through an immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) knowing them gives us reasons to act independent of our desires. The author rebuts the major objections to this theory and shows th
<p>A defence of ethical intuitionism where (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know these through an immediate, intellectual awareness, or 'intuition'; and (iii) knowing them gives us reasons to act independent of our desires. The author rebuts the major objections to this theory and shows
<p>This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our