Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science: A Reply to Peter Ross

✍ Scribed by Martine Nida-Rümelin

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 1999
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 23 KB
• Volume: 8
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 1053-8100
• DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1999.0415

✦ Synopsis

Commentary on P. W. Ross (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Ru ¨melin. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 566-570.

1 More precisely my aim was to show that certain versions of functionalism violate the prima facie constraint cited in Ross's paper. But, for simplicity, it will be sufficient to think of a conflict in the sense of logical incompatability. The argument can also be formulated in this way if one restricts the attack to those versions of functionalism that deny that pseudonormal people would be red-green inverted (the externalist versions of functionalism Ross has in mind are an example thereof). Contrary to this, the accepted theory about the physiological basis of color vision implies that they would be red-green inverted. (For this way to put the point see my more recent paper (Nida-Ru ¨melin, 1999).