When insurance firms can monitor with non-prohibitive costs the consumption of risk-influencing goods by an insured they have incentives to tax-subsidize the insured's consumption of the goods. If the government cannot monitor at a lower cost than private insurers, intervention is neither needed nor
β¦ LIBER β¦
International Risk Sharing and Government Moral Hazard
β Scribed by Wolf Wagner
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 404 KB
- Volume
- 18
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0923-7992
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