Toward the closc of World War 11, strong rumours from many reliable sources suggested that the German High Command were formulating plans to establish a second front in Bavaria. The Allied military commanders took heed; they diverted sorely needed forces to meet such a contingency. Thus was the postwar map of Europe decided, because this move allowed the Russians to conquer a much larger area of Germany than they otherwise would have in the time available.
Had those same Allied generals read a report produced by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, they would have discovered that assembling a critical mass of German troops in Bavaria was both strategically unsound and logistically impossible. The title of that report was as follows: A n Analysis of the Political and Social Otganiration, the Com rtz u ri ica t ions, Eco nom ic Controls, Agricultural and Food supply, Mineral Resources, Manufacturing and Transportat ion Facilities (If South Germany. Is it any surprise that the Allied generals didn't bother to read it?
More than 100 years earlier (in 1843), the following report was telegraphed by General Sir Charles James Napier to the British War Office following his victory at Hyderabad, in Sind: Peccavi. Now, as everyone who had received an education in England at that time would have known, Peccavi is Latin for, "I have sinned" (Sind). Napier was well aware of this, and was able to produce the briefest of reports while retaining all the essential information.
Stimulating Executive Action
A fornial definition might state that a report may contain the finding5 of an iiivestigation or study, or offer an iiiter-