This paper traces the origin of intelligence in biological organisms, thought of as negative entropy systems, relating it to both perception and mobility. A distinction is made between behaviour which is a function of an animal's beliefs about its circumstances, and behaviour which is related to those circumstances more directly, only behaviour of the former sort being regarded as intelligent. It is claimed that in order to provide a model of the human mind, a robot would have to possess not only intelligence but also a use for that intelligence; and for that to be so it would have to possess purposes which were its own, not simply those of its manufacturer. There would, that is, have to be things which it was not only able but wanted to do. And for that to be so, its experience of the world would have to possess not simply an epistemic but also a phenomenal aspect. It could not be assumed that that would be so, however, since a robot, even if functionally equivalent to a person, would presumably be structured differently and made of different materials.
Wanting things done and wanting to do things
Persons, like all living things, are the result of a long process of evolution. Unless we are prepared to think of evolution as the instrument of a divine purpose, therefore, their existence is a kind of cosmic accident. They are not there for a 167