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Institutional and Organizational Analysis: Concepts and Applications (New Approaches to Economic and Social History)

โœ Scribed by Eric Alston, Lee J. Alston, Bernardo Mueller, Tomas Nonnenmacher


Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Year
2018
Tongue
English
Leaves
410
Category
Library

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โœฆ Synopsis


What explains the great variability in economic growth and political development across countries? Institutional and organizational analysis has developed since the 1970s into a powerful toolkit, which argues that institutions and norms rather than geography, culture, or technology are the primary causes of sustainable development. Institutions are rules that recognized authorities create and enforce. Norms are rules created by long-standing patterns of behavior, shared by people in a society or organization. They combine to play a role in all organizations, including governments, firms, churches, universities, gangs, and even families. This introduction to the concepts and applications of institutional and organizational analysis uses economic history, economics, law, and political science to inform its theoretical framework. Institutional and organizational analysis becomes the basis to show why the economic and political performance of countries worldwide have not converged, and reveals the lessons to be learned from it for business, law, and public policy.

โœฆ Table of Contents


Cover
Half-title page
Series page
Title page
Copyright page
Dedication
Contents
List of
Figures
List of
Tables
Acknowledgments
List of
Abbreviations
Introduction
Examples of Institutional and Organizational Analysis
The Decline of Littering in the United States
Land Reform in Brazil
Beliefs and Empire: Understanding the Decline of Portugal in the Sixteenth Century
Overview of the Book
Part I From Institutions to Economic Outcomes
Introduction to Part Topics
1 Institutions and Property Rights
Introduction and Opening Case: Institutions and Norms in Yucatรกn, Mexico
Institutions
Norms
Individuals
Organizations
Enforcement versus Equilibrium Behavior
De Jure and De Facto Property Rights
Conclusion
2 Property Rights and Transaction Costs
Introduction and Opening Case: Intellectual Property Rights
Defining Transaction Costs
Transaction Costs and Information
The โ€œCoase Theoremโ€
Case Study: Titles and Land Conflict in the Brazilian Amazon
Conclusion
3 Organizations and Contracts
Case Study: Oil Production and Unitization
Firms in Classical and Neoclassical Economics
Monitoring and Agency Theory
Case Study: Postbellum Southern Agriculture
Asset Specificity and Governance Theory
Case Study: Coal Mines and Power Plants
Ownership and the โ€œNewโ€ Property-Rights Theory
Ownership of the Firm
Hybrids
Conclusion
Part II From Economic Outcomes to Political Performance
Introduction to Part Topics
Tools and Concepts for Analyzing Institutions and Government
Principal-Agent Models
The โ€œCoase Theoremโ€ and Credible Commitment
Institutions, Commitment, and Performance
Impossibility, Chaos, and Structure-Induced Equilibria
The Riker Objection
Appendix: Primer on Spatial Models
4 Special Interests and Citizens
Introduction and Opening Case: Interest Groups and the Legalization of Marijuana
Public Interest and Simple Capture Theories
Demand for Government Intervention
Competition among Interest Groups
Public Choice and Rent-Seeking
Empirical Tests of Interest Group Theories
When Predictions Fail: Deregulation and Interest Group Theories
Interest Groups in a Web of Principal-Agent Relations
Influencing Policy by Affecting the Organizations Involved
Changing Preferences of Other Organizations
Changing the Powers of Other Organizations
Affecting Policy by Manipulating Information of Other Organizations
Conclusion
5 The Legislature and Executive
Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism
Distributive/Informational/Partisan Theories of Congressional Committees
Distributive Theory of Congressional Institutions
Informational Theory of Congressional Institutions
Majority-Party Theory
Choosing among Theories
Two-Party Systems versus Multiple-Party Systems
Duvergerโ€™s Law: The Causes and Impacts of Plurality Rule versus Proportional Representation
The Origins of the Two-Party System in the United States
Conclusion
6 Bureaucracies
Introduction and Opening Case: โ€œLet Them Be Bribedโ€
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Congressional Dominance
Bureaucratic Discretion and Autonomous Agencies
Presidential Control of Bureaucratic Agencies
Legal Constraints on Bureaucratic Action
Bureaucracies and Delegation in a Multiple-Principal Context
Conclusion
7 The Judicial System
Institutional Analysis of the Judiciary
Independence
Accountability
Reputation
Limits on Judicial Power: Diffusion and Separation of Authority
Theories of Judicial Behavior and Incentives
Institutional Role of the Judiciary
Introductory Case: Marbury v. Madison
Constitutional Oversight
Constraint of Government Agents
Facilitation of Ideal Characteristics of the Legal System
Conclusion
Concluding Case (Kenya, 2010โ€“2017): Reforms to Improve Judicial Independence and Reputation
Part III The Dynamics of Economic and Political Development
Introduction to Part Topics
8 Developmental Trajectories: Institutional Deepening and Critical Transitions
Understanding Autopilot and Critical Transitions
Understanding Why Developmental Trajectories Do Not Converge
Understanding a Critical Transition
Windows of Opportunity
Leadership
Constitutions and Constitutional Moments
Critical Transitions
Dynamic of Institutional Deepening during a Virtuous Critical Transition
Potential Benefits of Critical Transitions: Institutions as Facilitating Complexity and Resilience
Conclusion
9 Case Studies of Critical Transitions: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and the United States
United States, 1783โ€“1789: Transitioning from โ€œStates Ruleโ€ to the United States of America
Argentina, 1912โ€“1955: Budding Belief in Checks and Balances to Redistributive Populism
Brazil, 1985โ€“2014: Belief in Social Inclusion to Fiscally Sound Social Inclusion
Ecuador, 1998โ€“2017: From a Neoliberal Belief to a Belief in Inclusive Politics
Conclusion
Conclusion
References
Index


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