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Information efficiency and majority decisions

โœ Scribed by Hans Gersbach


Publisher
Springer
Year
1995
Tongue
English
Weight
491 KB
Volume
12
Category
Article
ISSN
0176-1714

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โœฆ Synopsis


The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community. Economic Litera- ture Classification Number D70, D71, D80.


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