Information efficiency and majority decisions
โ Scribed by Hans Gersbach
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1995
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 491 KB
- Volume
- 12
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community. Economic Litera- ture Classification Number D70, D71, D80.
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