Inferences in Context: Contextualism, Inferentialism and the Concept of Universal Quantification

✍ Scribed by Chiara Tabet

• Publisher: University of St. Andrews
• Year: 2008
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 288
• Series: A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. Andrews
• Edition: First
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Full metadata for this item is available in the St Andrews
Digital Research Repository
at:
https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/688
This item is protected by original copyright

✦ Table of Contents

INFERENCES IN CONTEXT
CONTEXTUALISM, INFERENTIALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL
QUANTIFICATION
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION p. 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS p. 8
PART 1
INFERENTIALISM, CONCEPT-CONSTITUTION AND CONCEPT-POSSESSION
CHAPTER I: THE LOGICAL CONCEPTS AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BASIC LOGICAL
PRINCIPLES p. 9
1. Boghossian’s Project p. 13
1.1 Against Epistemic Relativism p. 14
1.2 Difficulties for Anti-Relativist Arguments p. 18
1.3 Concept-Constitution and the Epistemology of Basic Logical Principles p. 20
2. Who is Blameless and Who Is Entitled? Some Problems with Boghossian’s
Project p. 22
2.1 Concept-Constitution and Blamelessness p. 22
2.2 Replies p. 31
2.3 Blamelessness and Entitlement p. 34
3. What is Concept-Constituting? Rules and Inferential Practices p. 40
References p. 51
CHAPTER II: CONCEPT-CONSTITUTION, CONCEPT-POSSESSION AND COMMITMENT p. 53
1. Inferential Practices p. 54
1.1 The First Objection p. 56
1.2 The Second Objection p. 68
1.3 The Third Objection p. 70
2. Methodology p. 72
3. Canonical grounds, Canonical Consequences and Concept-Constitution p. 77
3.1 Claims p. 78
3.2 Canonical Grounds and Canonical Consequences p. 78
3.3 Canonical Inferences and Concept-Constitution – Objections p. 84
4. Commitment and Concept-possession p. 90
4.1 Verificationist and Pragmatist Approaches to Concept-Constitution p. 90
4.2 Concept-Possession p. 94
4.3 A Problem p. 105
4.4 Reformulations of Claim B p. 107
4.5 Sufficiency p. 110
References p. 112
PART 2
CONTEXTUALISM AND THE COMMITMENT-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF UNIVERSAL
QUANTIFICATION
CHAPTER III: COMMITMENTS, QUANTIFICATION AND ABSOLUTE GENERALITY p. 114
1. Universal Quantification: Three Constraints p. 114
1.1 Preliminary Discussion p. 115
1.2 The Three Constraints p. 120
2. Rules, Schemas and Canonical Commitments p. 138
2.1 ∀-Introduction and ∀-Elimination: Three Options p. 138
3. Schemas and Quantificational Generality p. 150
3.1 On the Plausibility of Option 1 p. 151
3.2 On the Plausibility of Option 2 p. 161
3.3 On the Plausibility of Option 3 p. 173
3.4 A Proposal p. 178
References p. 185
CHAPTER IV: INFERENTIAL COMMITMENTS IN CONTEXT p. 188
1. The Domain Model and a Foundational Semantics for the Universal Quantifier
p. 190
1.1 Terminology and Structure p. 190
1.2 The Domain Model p. 194
1.3 Foundational vs. Descriptive Semantics p. 196
2. Domains and Canonical Commitments p. 198
2.1 Background p. 198
2.2 Case I: Unrestricted Usages of the Universal Quantifier p. 202
2.2 Case II: Restricted Usages of the Universal Quantifier p. 205
3. Domains and Canonical Warrants p. 211
3.1 Background p. 211
3.2 The Problem p. 213
3.3 Qualifications: Which Kind of Circularity? p. 218
4. Domains in Context p. 222
4.1 Background p. 222
4.2 A Possible Scenario p. 225
4.3 Interpretation: The Options p. 226
5. Commitments in Context p. 240
5.1 Commitments as Propositional Presuppositions p. 243
5.2 Qualifications and Clarifications p. 254
5.3 Commitments, Contexts and Propositional Failure p. 265
References p. 268
CONCLUSIONS p. 271
BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 276