Ineffability in Frege's logic

✍ Scribed by Philip Hugly

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1973
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 868 KB
• Volume: 24
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00356488

✦ Synopsis

In this paper I consider the bearing of Frege's philosophical logic on the questions of (i) what can and cannot be said in the discussion of logical types and (ii) what is involved in symbolizing things of different logical types.

I try to show, first, that certain ideas can be found in Frege's logical thoughts and, second, that they lead to certain answers to these questions. I think of these answers as being Fregean. However, they were not explicitly stated by Frege. Nor can I prove that the ideas I think I find in Frege's logical thoughts are really there, for I lack decisive textual evidence. On the other hand, were such evidence available, then mere reporting would have sufficed for my purposes.

Obviously, the work set forth below was done because I wanted to understand Frege. But I also wanted a better understanding of the respects in which Wittgenstein's philosophical logic might have grown out of a consideration of Frege's. I mention this because it may help make it intelligible why I find some of the things I say worth saying.