We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different organizati
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
โ Scribed by Maskin, Eric; Qian, Yingyi; Xu, Chenggang
- Book ID
- 108533905
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2000
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 138 KB
- Volume
- 67
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0034-6527
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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