Incentives for firms to provide safety: Regulatory authority and capital market reactions
✍ Scribed by Ivy E. Broder; John F. Morrall
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1991
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 995 KB
- Volume
- 3
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0922-680X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
We investigate the relationship between the various incentives that firms have to act safely, focusing on the relationship between the equity losses experienced by a firm following a fa~[ accident and the incentive effects created by government regulation. The major findings are that first, the capital market reactions vary dramatically by which agency has regulatory jurisdiction for the accident. And second, the capital market effects tend to be weak (equity values do not decline sizably) where federal agencies rely heavily on an ex ante inspection policy. On the other hand, where ex ante inspection policy is lax or nonexistent, capital market effects tend to be strong --up to an order of magnitude higher per fatality than willingness-to-pay estimates based on labor market data.