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Incentives and selection in cyclical absenteeism

✍ Scribed by Mahmood Arai; Peter Skogman Thoursie

Book ID
116714201
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2005
Tongue
English
Weight
122 KB
Volume
12
Category
Article
ISSN
0927-5371

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