Incentive Alignment, CEO Pay Level, and Firm Performance: A Case of “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose”?
✍ Scribed by Wm. Gerard Sanders
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 108 KB
- Volume
- 40
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0090-4848
- DOI
- 10.1002/hrm.1005
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
Abstract
In recent years, rewarding CEOs with long‐term forms of compensation (e.g., stock options, performance plans, restricted stock) has become more popular than using year‐end pay adjustments. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence to support the benefits of this trend. This study found that the benefits of long‐term compensation flowed primarily to CEOs as they received significantly greater levels of total compensation than CEOs in firms that emphasized year‐end pay adjustments. Paradoxically, however, firms that emphasized year‐end pay adjustments performed significantly better than firms that were heavy users of long‐term forms of contingent compensation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.