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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

✍ Scribed by Luis Corchón; Matteo Triossi

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 246 KB
Volume: 36
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9

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