Implementation of the Thompson mechanism

✍ Scribed by Martin J. Bailey

• Book ID: 104648636
• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1996
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 785 KB
• Volume: 89
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00159357

✦ Synopsis

This paper reconsiders the largely overlooked Thompson insurance mechanism for public choice. The mechanism's apparent defects can be remedied by a multi-part mechanism that generates necessary information and corrects potential errors. The added parts are (a) a sample of the population of eligible voters, who prepare a program for all voters' approval, and (b) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pivot mechanism. One can use classical statistical methods to draw valid inferences from a population sample about the entire electorate, preserving incentive compatibility and permitting efficient outcomes. * The author is indebted to Peter Aranson and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. The errors and omissions that remain are my own.