HART AND THE CLAIMS OF ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE* Bayles' posthumously published Hart's Legal Philosophy l covers all of Hart's work in analytic and critical jurisprudence except his coauthored work on causation. Quibbles aside, it is probably the best survey of Hart's jurisprudential work in print. Hart's Legal Philosophy stands up well to its likely competitors in every respect except price. The depth of coverage is greater than MacCormick's H. L. A. Hart, and the quality of presentation and critical commentary exceeds that of Martin's The Legal Philosophy of H. L. A. Hart and Moles' Definition and Rule in Legal Theory. Bayles methodically rehearses in close detail Hart's handling of topics, canvasses relevant secondary literature up to 1990, and provides defenses and friendly criticism.
Given the format of the book, it is more in the nature of a reference work than a sustained argument. A resulting weakness is that points raised in one place are forgotten at other places, and that sometimes arguments are too incomplete to be convincing. I shall illustrate the weakness by commenting on three familiar topics Bayles addresses: the validity of legal rules, Hart's commitment to semantic claims concerning the "open texture" of general legal terms, and the inclusion of legal principles among the corpus of legal sources.
THE VALIDITY OF LEGAL RULES