Gödel, Penrose and the possibility of AI
✍ Scribed by T. Dodd
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1991
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 866 KB
- Volume
- 5
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0269-2821
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
It is argued that Penrose's use of G6del's theorem to show that no machine can reproduce the achievements of a human mathematician depends on extra assumptions that would also show that no machine could ever check the validity of mathematical proofs: and it is claimed that the latter result contradicts views about the possibility of communicating mathematical proofs that are widely held and that are endorsed by Penrose.
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