Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures

✍ Scribed by Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)

• Publisher: Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
• Year: 1998
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 235
• Series: Center for Chemical Process Safety ''Guidelines'' series
• Edition: Har/Dis
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

While there is no "perfect" solution or absolute zero risk, engineering design can significantly reduce risk potential in the CPI. In Guidelines for Design Solutions to Process Equipment Failures, industry experts offer their broad experience in identifying numerous solutions to the more common process equipment failures including inherent safer/passive, active, and procedural solutions, in decreasing order of robustness and reliability. The book challenges the engineer to identify opportunities for inherent and passive safety features early, and use a risk-based approach to process safety systems specification. The book is organized into three basic sections: 1) a technique for making risk-based design decisions; 2) potential failure scenarios for 10 major processing equipment categories; and 3) two worked examples showing how the techniques can be applied. The equipment categories covered are: vessels, reactors, mass transfer equipment, fluid transfer equipment, solids-fluid separators, solids handling and processing equipment, and piping and piping components.

✦ Table of Contents

Front Matter......Page 1
Foreword......Page 3
Preface......Page 5
Acknowledgments......Page 7
Table of Contents......Page 0
TOC.pdf......Page 9
1.1 Objectives......Page 18
1.3 Background......Page 19
1.5 Organization of This Book......Page 20
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 21
2.1 Risk-Based Design Decisions......Page 22
2.2 The Concept of Risk......Page 24
2.3.2 Step 2: Estimate the Consequences......Page 26
2.3.4 Step 4: Estimate Likelihood and Risk......Page 28
2.3.6 Step 6: Consider Enhanced and/or Alternative Designs......Page 29
2.3.9 Step 9: Document Results......Page 30
2.4 Guidelines for Risk Tolerability......Page 31
2.5.1 Four Categories of Design Solutions......Page 37
2.5.2 Characteristics of Design Solution Categories......Page 41
2.6.1 Locking Open a Valve (a Simple Design Case)......Page 44
2.6.2 Selecting the Relief System Basis for a Reactor (a Complex Design Case)......Page 47
2.7 References......Page 51
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 52
3.2.1 Storage Tank Autopolymerization Incident......Page 54
3.2.2 Storage Tank Stratification Incident......Page 55
3.2.3 Batch Pharmaceutical Reactor Accident......Page 56
3.4.1 Use of Potential Design Solutions Table......Page 57
3.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 58
3.5 References......Page 60
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 61
Table 3. Failure Scenarios for Vessels......Page 62
4.2 Past Incidents......Page 78
4.2.2 3,4-Dichloroaniline Autoclave Incident......Page 79
4.3 Failure Scenarios and Design Solutions......Page 80
4.4.2 General Discussion......Page 81
4.4.3 Special Considerations......Page 83
4.5 References......Page 84
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 85
Table 4. Failure Scenarios for Reactors......Page 86
5.2 Past Incidents......Page 95
5.2.2 Ethylene Purifier Vessel Rupture......Page 96
5.2.3 Ignition of Pyrophoric Materials in Gasoline Fractionator......Page 97
5.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 98
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 99
Table 5. Failure Scenarios for Mass Transfer Equipment......Page 100
6.2.1 Ethylene Oxide Redistillation Column Explosion......Page 105
6.2.2 Brittle Fracture of a Heat Exchanger......Page 106
6.2.3 Cold Box Explosion......Page 107
6.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 108
6.5 References......Page 109
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 110
Table 6. Failure Scenarios for Heat Transfer Equipment......Page 111
7.2 Past Incidents......Page 116
7.2.3 Pharmaceutical Powder Dryer Fire and Explosion......Page 117
7.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 118
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 119
Table 7. Failure Scenarios for Dryers......Page 121
8.2.1 Reciprocating Pump Leak......Page 131
8.2.3 Compressor Fire and Explosion......Page 132
8.4.1 Use of Potential Design Solutions Table......Page 133
8.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 134
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 135
Table 8. Failure Scenarios for Fluid Transfer Equipment......Page 136
9.2 Past Incidents......Page 141
9.2.2 Filter Explosion......Page 142
9.3 Failure Scenarios and Design Solutions......Page 143
9.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 144
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 145
Table 9. Failure Scenarios for Solid-Fluid Separators......Page 146
10.1 Introduction......Page 150
10.2.2 Blowing Agent Blender Operation Explosion Incident......Page 151
10.3 Failure Scenarios and Design Solutions......Page 152
10.4.3 Special Considerations......Page 153
10.5 References......Page 155
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 156
Table 10. Failure Scenarios for Solids Handling and Processing Equipment......Page 157
11.2.1 Light-off Error......Page 162
11.2.3 Furnace Tube Failure......Page 163
11.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 164
11.5 References......Page 165
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 166
Table 11. Failure Scenarios for Fired Equipment......Page 167
12.2.1 Flixborough Expansion Joint Failure......Page 174
12.2.2 Chemical Storage Terminal Fire......Page 175
12.3 Failure Scenarios and Design Solutions......Page 176
12.4.2 Special Considerations......Page 177
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 179
Table 12. Failure Scenario for Piping and Piping Components......Page 181
Append.pdf......Page 189
A.1 System Description......Page 190
A.2 General Information Requirements......Page 193
A.3.1 Vessel Design and Primary Containment......Page 194
A.3.2 Control Systems and Safe Automation......Page 195
A.3.3 Pressure and Vacuum Relief......Page 198
A.4 Selection of Design Bases for Safety Systems......Page 199
A.5 Ignition of Flammable Atmosphere in the Reactor Vapor Space Caused by Static Discharge Spark (Failure Scenario A)......Page 205
A.6 Cooling System Control Failure (Failure Scenario B)......Page 206
A.7 External Fire (Failure Scenario C)......Page 208
A.8 Loss of Sealing Fluid to Reactor Agitator Mechanical Seal (Failure Scenario D)......Page 209
A.9 Ignition of Flammable Atmosphere in Reactor Vapor Space Caused by Hot Mechanical Seal (Failure Scenario E)......Page 211
A.10 Documentation......Page 212
Suggested Additional Reading......Page 213
Glossary......Page 215
Acronyms and Abbreviations......Page 224
B......Page 228
D......Page 229
F......Page 230
L......Page 231
O......Page 232
R......Page 233
U......Page 234
W......Page 235