๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games

โœ Scribed by Maria Koth; Karl Sigmund

Publisher
Springer
Year
1987
Tongue
English
Weight
699 KB
Volume
25
Category
Article
ISSN
0303-6812

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis

The evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games is studied for rescaled partnership games and zero sum games. The former case leads to gradient systems. The selection equations for sexual and asexual reproduction of genotypes corresponding to mixed strategies are analysed. As examples, the origin of anisogamy and cyclic chases for predator-prey coevolution are studied.

๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

On the set of (perfect) equilibria of a
On the set of (perfect) equilibria of a bimatrix game
โœ A. J. Vermeulen; M. J. M. Jansen ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1994 ๐Ÿ› John Wiley and Sons ๐ŸŒ English โš– 381 KB ๐Ÿ‘ 1 views

This article provides a new approach to the set of (perfect) equilibria. With the help of an equivalence relation on the strategy space of each player, Nash sets and Selten sets are introduced. The number of these sets is finite and each of these sets is a polytope. As a consequence the set of (perf