✦ LIBER ✦

Good public policy requires good science

✍ Scribed by Edward G. Feldmann

Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 1984
Tongue: English
Weight: 147 KB
Volume: 73
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-3549
DOI: 10.1002/jps.2600730802

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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