Through the centuries few themes have bewitched man's intellectual endeavor more than the problem of evil. Theologians and philosophers still ponder its effects on the credibility of the Christian faith. Evaluating the problem is difficult, since it involves a complex interplay of moral values, ontological commitments, logical principles, and religious loyalties. To understand better the problem of evil many philosophers have analyzed in detail its internal structure. These analyses frequently differ and are not always helpful. In this article, I survey the recent literature on the topic and note ways in which the problem has been conceived. Then I analyze and evaluate two important conceptions-the problems of consistency and gratuity-which are keys to understanding the traditional and current scholarship on God and evil. Last, I offer several observations on the subject. Some philosophers have thought that the problem of evil is not just one particular argument, but a cluster of arguments, each relating to a certain area of concern and having an identifiable structure. Of course, the precise rendition of the argument which one countenances determines the direction of his analysis. A brief survey of the different ways in which philosophers have distinguished formulations of the problem would be helpful.
H. D. Aiken divides the problem of evil into the logical and the existential problems. The former pertains to the relations of key ideas contained in two essential theistic claims: (a) there is an almighty and omniscient being who is a perfectly good person and who alone is God; and (b) there is something in the finite universe created by that being which is evil. 1 Yet he says that the problem of holding these two propositions together is only a sterile exercise in formal logic compared to "the problem of faith and conscience" which may occur in the personal life of the believer who has a disposition to affirm both of them. Calling them the theological and ethical theses, respectively, he explains that faith holds to (a) and conscience affirms (b). Since they are apparently contradictory, the self which strives to maintain loyalty to both is faced with a serious existential problem.
M. B. Ahern designates three divisions of the problem of evil: (1) the general abstract problem, (2) the specific abstract problems, and (3) the 1 Henry David Aiken, "God and Evil: A Study of Some Relations Between Faith and Morals," Ethics, 68 (Jan., 1958), p. 79; the following quote is on p. 77.