In Reason and Morality, Alan Gewirth joins the classic debate in ethics about the possibility and necessity of justifying a supreme and objective moral principle. 1 Gewirth argues that he has justified what he labels the principle of generic consistency (PGC), that every agent ought to act in accord with the generic rights of freedom and well-being of his recipients as well as of himself. In this article I point out two major theoretical contributions of Gewirth's theory to moral philosophy. These contributions alone deserve serious attention. I say this, for I also argue in the major portion of this article, that although Gewirth attempts to justify a supreme moral principle, he only justifies a moral principle which is true when it is stated. In Gewirth's terms, the goal is the assertoric PGC, but he simply reaches the dialectical PGC. In the process I will set forth Gewirth's argument in a manner that has not been done previously, by Gewirth or by any of his critics.
1. Gewirth's contributions
Moral philosophers characteristically assume that deontological moral theories mutually exclude teleological moral theories. Since moral theories bridging the gap are rare, it is certainly reasonable to explore the possibility of constructing new theories which offer a compromise. Gewirth notes the need for such a compromise as early as 1965, in his preface to Political Philosophy.2 His formulation of the PGC offers such a compromise, and avoids the central difficulties of deontological and teleological moral theories. It includes specific content (rights to freedom and well-being) that deontological