𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

Cover of Game Theory and Economic Analysis

Game Theory and Economic Analysis

✍ Scribed by [edited by] Christian Schmidt


Book ID
106880781
Publisher
London ; Routledge, 2002.
Year
2002
Tongue
English
Weight
310 KB
Category
Fiction
ISBN-13
9780415259873

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis


SUMMARY:
This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole. After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as: *the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today *the strategic use of information by game players *the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players *cooperative games and their place within the literature of games new developments in non-cooperative games *possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.


πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Economic game theory for mutualism and c
✍ Marco Archetti; IstvΓ‘n Scheuring; Moshe Hoffman; Megan E. Frederickson; Naomi E. πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2011 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 697 KB
Game Theory and Risk Analysis
✍ Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox; Jr. πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2009 πŸ› Springer 🌐 English βš– 76 KB
Game Theory and Risk Analysis
✍ Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox; Jr. πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2009 πŸ› Springer 🌐 English βš– 76 KB

Risk analysts often analyze adversarial risks from terrorists or other intelligent attackers without mentioning game theory. Why? One reason is that many adversarial situationsβ€”those that can be represented as __attacker‐defender games__, in which the defender first chooses an allocation of defensiv